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Introduction
The effect of 'locking-in' economic reform and enhancing its credibility is generally regarded as one of the most important potential effects of regional integration. A sufficient level of credibility is required because investors, in particular foreign companies, are likely to stay away or respond negatively to reforms if they expect future back-sliding. This, in turn, encourages domestic interest groups opposing economic reform to urge the government to retract measures announced and/or conducted.
Like many other countries of the Middle East the Syrian Arab Republic has experienced several phases of economic reform since the beginning of the 1970s. Despite the fact that in each phase foreign trade and exchange policies played a major role and that reforms have accelerated considerably during the last two or three years, the current state of the Syrian foreign trade system is still highly restrictive. Reforms in general, and deregulation of the foreign Anja Zorob: Regional Integration Agreements and Reform 6 trade and exchange regime in specific, have followed a cautious, gradual and selective approach so far. This approach reflects primarily the many politico-economic constraints the Syrian process of economic reform is generally facing. As a consequence, the most important feature characterizing Syrian reform seems to be its lack of credibility at home and abroad.
To escape this trap or, in other words, to 'check' these constraints to a certain degree and to enhance credibility of reform, the Syrian government has several options, among them to accept legal commitments by signing an RIA. This in fact seems to have been, even if only indirectly, the policy option chosen by Syria when it started in 1998 as the last of all Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) to negotiate an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) in the framework of the European Mediterranean Partnership Initiative. The draft agreement was initialled by the chief negotiators of both parties in October 2004.
Whereas this was to formally mark the end of the years-long negotiations, the AA as such, however, is since then awaiting approval by the European Council and, as a result, still pending formal signature.
The structure of the paper will be as follows. Chapter 2 starts with a comprehensive review of the theoretical debate on the lock-in effect including a discussion of the costs and causes of a lack of credibility. Based on this, a general framework for assessment of RIAs to serve as an effective mechanism for 'commitment' and 'signalling' as a means of improving the credibility of a country's reform policy is designed in the second part of Chapter 2. Chapter 3 opens with an overview of the previous two phases and the ongoing third phase of economic reform in Syria analyzing its general features and highlighting the major constraints with special focus on liberalization of foreign trade and export orientation. This is followed by an evaluation of the ability of the Syrian-European Association Agreement to catalyze and anchor reforms in trade and other fields of the economy and to enhance the credibility of reform by applying the framework for assessment developed in chapter 2. Chapter 4 concludes by highlighting the main findings of the study and suggesting some policy conclusions.
Theoretical Framework: 'Locking-in' Reform and Enhancing Its Credibility

The Costs and Causes of a Lack of Credibility
'Locking-in' economic reform and enhancing its credibility is generally regarded as one of the most important effects of regional integration. Fernández/Portes denoted this effect as one of the potential 'non-traditional' benefits of regional integration with special reference to agreements involving a strong Northern partner or North-South-RIAs (see Fernández/Portes 1998) . Gov-7 ernment policy can be viewed as 'credible' if the expectations of private economic actors match the reform announcements stated by the government (see Funke 1991: 175) . Without a sufficient level of 'credibility' the process of reform might fail to produce the expected benefits in part or in whole or even spur on negative effects. This prompted Rodrik to argue that reform lacking credibility could prove worse than no reform at all (see Rodrik 1989: 3) .
There are different potential effects or costs of insufficient credibility. If private business fears that adjustment measures announced by the government are of a transitory nature and anticipate a future backsliding, they might prefer to adopt a wait-and-see-attitude. Alternatively they could try to benefit from the change in relative prices which they perceive to be temporary. This will be specifically the case in countries with a long tradition of protectionism and/or bad or no record of reform. On the supply side, efficiency gains of trade liberalization will at the very least be lower than hoped for. The distorted inter-temporal structure of relative prices acts as a disincentive for private entrepreneurs wanting to adjust and shift from former import substituting to export oriented activities. In the worst case, no adjustments will be made and there is no supply response. Investment in the export sector is burdened with additional risks creating an implicit tax on investment. On the demand side the reduction in import tariffs perceived as temporary might induce an import boom building up pressure on the current account and leading to a reduction in private savings. Without access to international finance, domestic interest rates will rise and exert a negative impact on investment and, accordingly, on the prospects for long-term growth (see Bender 1995: 155-156; Rodrik 1989: 2; Steingröver 1998: 15) . Besides price distortions, the lack of credibility could prompt private economic agents to spend additional funds on obtaining information. Furthermore, it may encourage different interest groups within society to try to influence the government's reform policy for their own benefit, probably forcing the process of reform to be blocked partially or wholly or even to be reversed altogether (see Funke 1991: 176-177) .
Assuming that economic agents act rationally, several major sources or broad explanations for a lack of credibility are distinguished in the literature. The first of them refers to the issue of unclear motives of the government in where economic agents don't know or are not sure about the real intentions or will of the government to pursue reforms. In other words the lack of credibility is caused by informational asymmetries. Doubts about the 'authenticity' of the government's commitment to reform often stem from a legacy of failed reform initiatives or policy reversals and/or from the fact that the same politicians who had formerly been the protagonists of protectionism are later trying to push for free trade. Another source causing insufficient credibility is provided by inconsistent economic policies. In this case the government fails to take into account or tries to violate fundamental budget constraints and accounting identities in the design of reforms or it attempts to pursue different political goals Anja Zorob: Regional Integration Agreements and Reform 8 simultaneously. One prominent example of the latter which almost certainly gives rise to conflicts between policies and most importantly between trade liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization is constituted by an over-valued exchange rate. The problem of dynamic or time-inconsistency, the third explanation for a lack of credibility, arises when the government is tempted to backslide on reforms already undertaken after the private sector has started to adjust. If the government is capable of doing so, private economic actors will anticipate opportunistic behaviour of the government and the reform plan will become dubious. Incentives for backsliding include a deteriorating fiscal balance as a result of trade liberalization prompting the government to re-impose tariffs (see Funke 1991: 179; Rodrik 1989: 4-7; Steingröver 1998: 15-16 ).
It has been noted above that in case a government's programme lacks credibility, different interest groups could try to exert pressure to block or even reverse reforms. Taking the other way round it could be argued that the very existence of powerful interest groups that oppose trade liberalization and the government's dependency on these interest groups for the sake of its own 'survival' automatically robs the government's reform policy of credibility no matter how it is designed and communicated in public. This applies in particular to those countries where the transfer and maintenance of power is not determined by political elections. In authoritarian systems in which several family clans dominate political as well as economic life and the framework of action is structured along networks of clientelism and patronage, public welfare is most probably not the leading motive driving economic decision-making. Instead, and in line with the above mentioned assumption stipulating that political and economic agents are trying to maximise their own benefit, the government or ruling elite is rather first and primarily interested in its own hold on power or its political 'survival' (see Nienhaus, 2000: 274) . Against this background regime security is determined by the ruling elite's ability to prevent other mechanisms that transfer power, like revolution, coup d'état or the surrender of political power to a successor. In such a setting it is much more important for the government to consider the impact of foreign trade liberalisation and adjustment on the interests of different groups of the society on which it relied in the past or is going to rely on to secure its own survival in the future. In general, it is possible to distinguish between interest groups that oppose or support trade liberalisation. Among those that could be regarded as reform opponents are any domestic industry engaged in import-substituting production, the import business, the public organs enforcing administration of import substitution, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the trade unions. These groups are expected to lose access to rents which are generated by protecting the domestic market and by strictly controlling foreign trade. They benefit, for example, from monopolistic market structures, income and employment in SOEs and corrup-tion in the public administration of foreign trade. The supporters of trade liberalisation consist of exporters and local consumers. The more the ruling elite depends on the loyalty of the groups expected to lose, the more its call for reforms will lack credibility. An additional factor contributing to a lack of credibility is that those in the government and administration who are responsible for the design and implementation of reforms are also to be counted among those losing out because of reform. Public officials risk being deprived of at least some of their personal privileges and fortunes derived from the stake they have in business or from being closely related to those people who do. Against this background it is questionable whether the government is willing and able to go for and communicate comprehensive trade liberalisation and structural adjustment. If it is willing to engage in comprehensive reform, the government needs to acquire approval for its plan from a sufficient number of interest groups concerned. Such an endeavour, however, usually requires making compromises as regards magnitude, choice and speed of measures to be conducted. Alternatively, but even more risky, the government could try to substitute some of the groups previously belonging to its 'supporting coalition' and thus opposing liberalisation with new groups supporting or set to benefit from opening the domestic market to international competition (see Bäcker 1996: 41-42; Nienhaus 2000: 275) .
One way to escape this trap and to raise the credibility of reform vis-à-vis domestic interest groups as well as companies and investors at home and abroad could be for the government of a developing country in general, and the MPCs in specific, to sign a trade agreement with a strong Northern partner like the EU (see, for example, Galal/Hoekman 1997a; Hoekman 1999 , Nienhaus 2000 . At the same time such a treaty offers the government of the developing country the opportunity to blame the Northern partner for the economic hardships to be expected from opening the domestic market.
RIAs as Signalling and Commitment Mechanisms
According to several authors an RIA can contribute to enhancing the credibility of reform by delivering a commitment and signalling mechanism for trade and other policy reform measures (see Fernández/Portes 1998: 202-209; Schiff/Winters 2003: 107-113) . For this to take effect, however, an agreement must meet several conditions as regards form, content and the choice of partner or 'anchor-sponsoring' country.
In order to deliver a commitment mechanism to overcome problems of time-inconsistency, an RIA should help to alter the future incentives for the government to act and to restrict its room for manoeuvre as illustrated in Figure 1 . There are several potential ways of achieving this. On the one hand, an agreement could boost the 'rewards for good policy'. On the other Anja Zorob: Regional Integration Agreements and Reform 10 hand, it may raise the 'costs of bad policy'. In general, for an RIA to function as a credible commitment mechanism, however, it needs to be as 'complete' as possible to guard against a future gradual erosion of the commitments made in the treaty and thus limit possible 'exitoptions' for both partners (for details on the concept of 'incomplete contracting' see Majone 2001; Williamson 1985) and/or to ensure that the costs the 'anchor-seeking' government has to face in case it decides for a full or partial exit from the agreement are higher than the benefits it is expected to gain from such a step (see Fernández/Portes 1998).
Figure 1: RIAs as Signalling and Commitment Mechanisms
To increase the costs of bad policy and restrict the government's room for manoeuvre an RIA should allow punishment by the other member(s) to the agreement in case it fails to fulfil the agreement's requirements. On a more direct level, the threat of losing international reputation as a result of the agreement's suspension or termination may raise the costs of bad policy to such a degree that it outweighs the benefits of a short-term return to the 'timeconsistent' policy of the government concerned. Furthermore, an agreement enhances the costs of bad policy if it leads to intensified competition on the domestic market thereby 'penalizing' bad policies such as a restrictive FDI policy, a general poor investment climate or weak fiscal consolidation. For the costs of bad policy to be increased effectively, however, not only competition on the anchor-seeking country's market must be intensified to a substantial degree as a result of the agreement's implementation. The anchor-sponsoring country or group of countries need to dispose of significant leverage on the international level and should be able as well as willing to exert pressure on the anchor-seeking country by way of punishment. This, in turn, requires that the agreement offers distinct possibilities and incentives for punishment, that the partner countries are stable and large enough, and that they are sufficiently interested in securing the RIA, to call the anchor-seeking country to discipline. In addition, reform measures to be implemented should be explicitly and clearly stated in the text of the agreement so as to give punishment a formal legal basis (see Schiff/ Winters 2003: 108-110; Tomz 1997: 6) . It has to be noted, however, that unilaterally applying sanctions against the partner risks triggering a subsequent cycle of mutually protectionist countermeasures. To prevent such a scenario RIAs should include a detailed dispute settlement mechanism. This mechanism, if designed appropriately, could deliver an effective instrument to distract the parties from breaching the agreement and, in case a dispute arises, to impede the parties from having immediate recourse to retaliation. According to Sezepesi a 'good' dispute settlement mechanism prepares the basis for consultation and arbitration, and makes sure that 'sanctions are used only as a measure of last resort' (Szepesi 2004: 1) .
Besides restricting the room for manoeuvre, a change in the government's future structure of incentives necessitates a shift in the government's tax collection and political basis from declining (import-substituting) sectors to growing (export-oriented) branches of the economy. In other words it is of major importance to what extent an RIA is able to contribute to enhancing the 'rewards for good policy'. This could be could be achieved through an agreement if it improves access to the partner country(-ies) market(s) and/or by providing the anchor-seeking developing country with technical and financial assistance. Finally, problems of time-inconsistency are not limited to possible changes in the incentives of the government who actually signs the treaty. Political time-inconsistency describes a situation in which the current government must expect its successors or future governments to have a different objective function calling for a reversal or dismissal of the former government's policy. In this case, the government signing the RIA has the chance to 'tie the hands' of future governments (Fernández/Portes 1998: 207) .
By serving as a commitment mechanism an RIA, however, helps not only to minimize problems of time inconsistency but is also able to send signals to economic agents. By 'tying the hands' of the government involved it gives a clear indication of the genuine will of the po-litical leaders. Nevertheless, an agreement can signal a government's will or 'true type' even without binding commitments provided that it costs a great deal to negotiate and get approval of the agreement 'at home'. In addition to showing its true type a government might wish to send signals regarding good future relations with the countries(-s) with which it wants to sign the RIA (see Schiff/Winters 2003: 111; Tomz 1997: 5) . The more detailed and clearly articulated the commitments in the agreement are and/or the higher the political and other costs which must be afforded to enter the agreement, the more pronounced will be its signalling effect.
Some authors emphasize that the credibility of a government's policy will hardly be improved by way of concluding an RIA if it is not already committed to reform (see Schiff/ Winters 2003: 111) . In this regard 'anchoring' has to be equated with a legal or contractual binding of liberalization measures the anchor-seeking country has already introduced before signing the RIA. Others argue, however, that a distinction should be made between two types of countries and therefore also types of agreements. The second category consists of countries in which 'significant liberalization and policy reform remain to be achieved' (Galal/ Hoekman 1997b: 3) . Those countries could benefit from entering RIAs with its major trading partners as part of their strategy to liberalize the economy. Thus the primary objective of the agreement is not to 'anchor' or 'lock-in' reform but to 'catalyze' measures of liberalization and other policy reforms.
Apart from the form and content of reform commitments, the success of trade reform depends on the appropriate 'timing' and 'sequencing' of measures to be adopted. There are two different opinions about the pace or speed of liberalisation -the shock approach or 'cold-turkey strategy' proposed by Rodrik versus the policy of gradual liberalisation introduced by Froot (see Rodrik 1989: 11-13) . Whereas the 'shock-therapy' entails potentially unbearable short-term adjustment costs for the developing country's economy, the gradual approach runs the risk of reforms being accompanied by a lack of credibility and opponents trying to undermine the programme. In practice, and despite the initial advantages of higher credibility, trade liberalisation seldom seems to be conducted in a very swift manner or as a 'shock-approach' (see Abdalla 1997: 273; Bäcker 1996: 37-38; Bender 1995: 148-150) . To deliver a sufficient degree of credibility it is important, however, that a gradual programme starts with a decisive and comprehensive first phase of measures combined with the announcement of a thorough and unequivocal schedule for further steps (see Bender 1995: 157; Steingröver 1998: 14-15) . Many RIAs seem to follow this thinking by incorporating schedules for dismantling trade barriers on a gradual basis.
Finally, there is the issue of complementary measures of structural adjustment in fields other than trade and solid macro-economic management. Measures of this kind are required to create the conditions necessary for a supply response and thus generally regarded to be of major importance for the success of trade liberalization. Moreover, liberalization of trade should be accompanied by measures to mitigate the negative effects on production, income and employment and by the establishment of social safety nets for affected income groups also as a means to appease domestic opposition against it (see Abdalla 1997: 273-275; Bender 1995: 157-158) . Thus, to assess an RIA's ability to improve the credibility of reform it could be asked to what extent it includes measures of macro-economic cooperation, adjustment in fields other than trade and supporting measures to cushion the negative effects of liberalization. In this context it should be kept in mind, however, that if different trade liberalization, stabilization and complementary measures of reform need to be implemented simultaneously, the problem of inconsistent policies which was mentioned above as one of the major sources for a lack of credibility is set to aggravate almost inevitably. Accordingly, appropriate sequencing of trade and other reforms becomes a crucial issue. Furthermore, since the problem of inconsistent policies arises when the government tries to violate fundamental budget constraints and accounting identities the 'degree of preparedness' of a country entering an RIA must be taken into account. Last but not least, it should be emphasized that concluding an RIA, regardless of its design and the partners involved, is not a panacea. According to Galal/Lawrence a trade agreement 'can provide opportunity and stimulus, but domestic policy must follow through' (Galal/Lawrence 2005: 40) . In other words, an RIA can't substitute for domestic reform. Instead, trade agreements should form an integral part of a comprehensive national reform programme that pursues a strategy of economic opening, liberalisation and adjustment.
The Case of the Syrian-European Association Agreement
Economic Reform in Syria: The Current State of Play and General Features
Like many other countries in the MENA region, Syria experienced two phases of economic reform between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1990s. The scope and sector coverage of measures conducted in both periods remained relatively limited when compared to regional neighbours. Whereas the latter in most cases opted for cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank to implement programmes of stabilization and structural adjustment, Syria refused external intervention. In the mid-1990s, the process of economic reform came more or less to a halt after the Syrian economy started to recover from the deep crisis it had to face during the preceding decade.
Despite the fact that trade reforms played a major role in both periods, the government in general abided by the strategy of import-substituting industrialization. High customs duties, numerous quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers combined with a system of multiple exchange rates, complex procedures for financing imports and the fact that foreign trade was mainly administered by public organizations kept the Syrian market highly protected from foreign competition. Export promotion was officially declared an objective during the second reform phase. Measures implemented to reach this goal, however, remained piecemeal and failed to stimulate a significant supply response by Syrian private business.
Compared to the Infitah of the 1970s, reforms conducted during the second phase were larger in scope and in sector coverage. The general approach of reform nevertheless remained cautious, gradual and selective. In addition to being implemented without external support, reforms did not seem either to have followed a pre-determined programme or to have a clear target for transformation. Although Syrian economists had started discussions about a social market economy as the preferred system to be attained, the Syrian administration came up at the beginning of the 1990s with the system of 'economic pluralism' in which private, mixed and public sectors were to be regarded as 'equal' partners in development. This Yen (see MEES 2007: 27) . Earlier in the third phase the administration had legalized the possession of foreign exchange and abolished the rule that Syrians must finance the import of specific goods from foreign exchange earned through exports. Concerning foreign trade regulations, the monopoly of import agencies was eliminated and provisions to prohibit, monopolise or limit imports were reduced on a product-by-product basis. In addition, customs duties were decreased for selected goods, mainly raw materials and other inputs for production. 1 mestic market and to take advantage of improved access to foreign markets as a result of free trade agreements signed with neighbouring and other countries. Furthermore, monopolistic market structures need to be broken up and competition rules be introduced. According to Syrian economists the main negative outcome of reforms implemented during the ongoing third phase is that former public monopolies have simply been replaced by private monopolies. The whole system, they continue to argue, regardless of level or sector, is more corrupt than ever before (see, for instance, Aita 2006; Sukkar 2005). Despite the above mentioned liberalization, the Syrian foreign trade system must still be classified as restrictive. As Table 1 shows, the simple average tariff stood at 14.6% in 2002
and was thus lower than in most other MPCs. Furthermore, as indicated in the previous section, tariff rates have been significantly lowered on a product-by-product basis in recent years. According to the 2006 IMF Staff Report customs duties have been unified and maximum rates reduced to 65% as compared to 255% at the beginning of the current decade.
There is, however, on the one hand, wide dispersion of tariff rates and high tariff escalation.
Since an updated complete tariff schedule incorporating all the changes made during the last two or three years seems currently not available, the number of tariff categories is esti- 
Past and Present Reform Constraints
One notable change, however, has occurred in the ongoing third phase of economic reform; In a nutshell, there still seem to be so many factors constraining the process of economic reform in Syria and which contribute to undermining the credibility of the Syrian government's programme of liberalisation and adjustment irrespective of how it is announced and in which form it is started. One way out of this dilemma could be provided by its signing an Association Agreement with the EU. An agreement of this kind would not only offer the opportunity to justify unpopular reforms vis-à-vis opponents to reform and the population at large. It might serve as an effective device for catalyzing and anchoring the measures which are required to liberalise the Syrian trade regime and enhancing the credibility of reform both domestically and internationally. To achieve this role, the Syrian-European AA, however, must fulfil certain conditions as outlined in the previous chapter.
The Potential Role of the Syrian-European AA for 'Locking-in' Reform
According to Hoekman the major advantage of the European-Mediterranean Association
Agreements is its potential to deliver a commitment mechanism and thus to provide more credibility to a gradual process of economic reform. Without binding commitments in the areas of investment and supply of services, combined with the exclusion of government procurement and the maintenance of antidumping rules and safeguard provisions as found, for example, in the AA concluded with Tunisia, however, the AAs with the MPCs would not go significantly beyond the disciplines agreed to in the framework of the WTO (see Hoekman 1999: 97-98) . In the Syrian case this is obviously not, at least not initially, the interesting question since it does not belong to the WTO and as mentioned above its accession is currently not on the cards. Moreover, the contents of the Syrian-European Association Agreement initialled on October 19, 2004 are much broader in scope and depth than the provisions included in the AAs with the other MPCs. These measures consist of the elimination of all import or export restrictions on trade between Syria and the EU, including prohibitions, quotas and import or export licensing requirements, other than customs duties and taxes.
Customs duties and other surcharges applicable to the import of industrial products into Syria will be reduced in a linear manner to zero according to different schedules over a transitional period of 12 years starting from the date on which the agreement enters into force.
All tariffs on products covered by the Information Technology Agreement as well as chemical products falling within HS chapters 35-38 will be abolished immediately. Except for cars, all duties above 50% will be brought down to 50% at the beginning of the transition period and be abolished in twelve years. Tariff rates for cars at 255% (145%) shall be reduced to 150% (65%) in the first three years and then be eliminated by the end of the transition period.
Reciprocal trade in agricultural products, processed agricultural products and fisheries between the EU and Syria shall be liberalised progressively. Syria, however, has committed itself to a far-ranging opening of its agricultural market. Similar to industrial goods, customs duties applicable to imports of agricultural products into Syria will be reduced to zero in a mechanism for economic reform, however, its definition as an essential element and the potential it provides for both parties to use it as an 'exit option' seems inappropriate.
In contrast to the AAs concluded with the other MPCs, the Syrian-European agreement includes in addition to the non-execution clause a separate and detailed mechanism for settling disputes in trade and trade-related matters. Similar to the mechanisms included in the 'most-developed' bilateral agreements which the EU has concluded so far with Mexico and Chile, the sophisticated dispute settlement mechanism with its detailed procedures, time limits and code of conduct should contribute effectively to deterring the parties from breach-ing the agreement's provisions and from immediately retaliating by using protectionist measures in case of a dispute. Moreover, the mechanism provides a way of preventing disputes being resolved by expression of political and economic power. The Syrian administration, however, should bear in mind that detailed dispute settlement provisions regardless of the advantages they offer require the appropriate institutional and personal equipment. It has been mentioned in the theoretical framework that besides the existence of formal punishment and dispute settlement mechanisms the anchor-sponsoring country or entity should be able and willing to exert pressure on the anchor-seeking country. This condition is best met if the partner is stable and large enough and is sufficiently interested in securing the RIA to discipline the anchor-seeking country. Certainly the EU is both a 'large' and 'stable'
partner. Moreover, Syria as one of the countries east of the Mediterranean is a geographical neighbouring of the EU. Therefore the EU might be anxious to cling to the AA once it is finally signed mainly for political reasons such: the maintenance of security and stability at the EU's borders, the containment of illegal migration and the fight against terrorism. In addition, although Syria is too small to play a prominent role as an export market for European goods, the EU might nevertheless be interested in regaining the share of the Syrian market it increasingly lost to competitors in recent years.
As outlined above, the costs of bad policy might be enhanced on a direct level if international reputation is lost or bad policies are penalized by intensified competition. Taking into account the scope of leverage which the EU is enjoying in the international arena the Syrian government would risk a large and probably unbearable loss of international reputation if it decided unilaterally to breach, suspend or revoke the treaty. Despite several shortcomings in the agreement's provisions such as the retention of antidumping and safeguard clauses as well as the enormous restructuring which Syrian institutions must undergo to develop the necessary capacities required for the implementation of the numerous reform commitments, competition on the domestic market nevertheless is expected to increase significantly. In other words, the AA together with the other free trade agreements signed with neighbouring Arab countries and Turkey should boost pressure on the Syrian government to refrain from 'bad policies'. Otherwise Syria runs the risk ending up on the losing side of the current inter-and intraregional integration initiatives and becoming the poor man of the region.
Besides increasing the costs of bad policy, future incentives of the anchor-seeking country's government might be altered by enhancing the 'rewards for good policy'. The agreement's channels for enhancing the rewards for good policy comprise of measures to improve access of the anchor-seeking country's goods and services to the market(s) of the other party (-ies) and to provide it with technical and financial assistance. According to Tovias/Ugur the AAs concluded in the framework of the EMP do not deliver enough incentives or are not 'incen-tive compatible' for MPC's governments to effectively 'tie their hands' (see Tovias/Ugur 2004) . In particular, improvement of market access granted by the EU would not only be insufficient in magnitude but would also be 'back-loaded' meaning that the concessions would benefit the MPCs only in the longer term. Like the agreements signed with the other MPCs, the Syrian-European AA's potential contribution to increasing the 'rewards for good policy' is obviously quite limited. As regards market access it must be noted that Syria has been granted duty-free access to the European market for its industrial goods in the framework of the 1977 cooperation agreement. In the case of agricultural produce, fisheries and processed agricultural goods, the AA includes substantial new concessions. Particularly for those products, however, which the Syrian administration defined as 'strategic', preferences are mainly subject to quotas and/or seasonal restrictions. In addition, improved market access to the European market is impeded by the EU's right to resort to contingent protection measures and by complex and restrictive rules of origin to name only the most important potential NTBs. The Paneuromediterranean System of Cumulation of Origin, in turn, which supposedly significantly mitigates the restrictiveness of the rules of origin incorporated in the AAs, might in fact only be of limited benefit at least if its current design is retained. Moreover, harmonization of standards or rather mutual recognition, is mentioned as a general target but not elaborated on in detail in the AA's provisions. Anyhow, agreements on mutual recognition and their potential benefits can be expected to materialise only in the long run and only if the EU is prepared to provide substantial technical and financial assistance to Syrian institutions to build up the required capacities. Contrary to most of the agreements concluded with the other MPCs the provisions of the Syrian-European AA stipulate also rights of establishment with which investors from both parties are granted national or MFN treatment in all branches not included in the parties' reservation lists. In addition, the goods, services and suppliers of both partners are offered national treatment for selected entities in public procurement. Given the reciprocity of these concessions, however, it will certainly be European companies that benefit the most from these concessions.
According to some authors, the overall success of the AAs and, in particular, their ability to enhance the credibility of reform in the MPCs depends on the quality and magnitude of financial and technical assistance offered by the EU and its 'implicit linkage' to the implementation of the agreement's provisions (see Ghesquiere 1998, p. 20; Hoekman 1999, p. 98) .
As illustrated in Table 3 , the amounts committed or allocated to Syria by the EU in the framework of the MEDA programme, the former principal financial instrument of the EU for the implementation of the EMP, and its successor the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENPI), are substantially lower than the amounts provided for most of the other Arab MPCs.
The same is true for lending offered by the European Investment Bank (EIB) if the period from 1992 onwards is taken as a basis for evaluation. If actual payments or the amounts finally disbursed are assessed, the picture becomes even worse. Of the amounts committed in the framework of MEDA I only one third have been actually disbursed. Therefore to be able to encourage the Syrian government in the future by enhancing the 'rewards for good policy' and thus assuming an active role in locking-in economic reform, the Union and its member countries need to increase substantially their assistance in the form of grants, loans and technical assistance. Although the EU has provided little assistance to the MPCs as a group relative to the magnitude of reform and liberalization that these countries have committed themselves to within the framework of the AAs, it has to be noted, however, that the Syrian administration itself has to take some of the responsibility for the limited amounts committed and disbursed (for a detailed account of EU assistance to Syria see Zorob 2006b; European Commission 2007c). To be realistic, however, one can hardly expect the EU to back up the Syrian economy with the same amount of massive financial assistance which the USA gave to Mexico in the 1990s
to help it to escape a major balance of payments crisis (for details on the US' assistance to
Mexico and the implementation of NAFTA see Francois 1997) . Nor can one expect EU assistance to compensate for the high short-term adjustment costs which the Syrian economy certainly will have to face as a result of opening-up its domestic market to European competition. This is not to deny, however, that EU assistance to Syrian reform generated notable positive effects in recent years. As indicated in the first section of this chapter, European Another cause for concern is represented by fiscal developments. Due to an expansionary fiscal policy and simultaneously declining oil export revenues in recent years, the budget deficit rose to an estimated 4.2% of GDP in 2005 as reported by the IMF or 5.1% as claimed by the CBS. The crucial question is, however, whether the government will be able in the years to come to contain the budget deficit at a level below 5% of GDP as stipulated in the 10 th FYP. This is because oil-related revenues still accounted for some 30% of total budget revenues in 2005, although they did decline from more than 50% at the beginning of the decade. Accordingly, the non-oil budget deficit was estimated to be 13% of GDP in the same year. With oil reserves depleting and production showing a steady decline since the second half of the 1990s, Syria is expected to become a net-importer of oil during the next years.
This will generate further pressure on the state budget and, of course too, the current account. In addition, the sale of fuel on the domestic market is heavily subsidised. If oil subsidies were priced in, the 2005 fiscal deficit would jump to over 22% of GDP (see IMF 2007a) .
To escape the fate of a major fiscal as well as balance of payment crisis the Syrian economy urgently needs to promote alternative sources of exports, growth and income away from its high dependency on oil and other rent flows. Moreover, the government should restructure public finances in order to substitute oil-related with non-oil, tax-based revenues. Such a restructuring could include as well, on the side of public spending, a cut in subsidies as rec- Table 4 , falls far behind most of the other countries of the region, need to be improved. In particular the rule of law and the fight against fraud and corruption must be enhanced. Without these measures though there have been some first positive signs of increased FDI inflows in the last two years, in particular, from the Arab Gulf countries, the Syrian economy won't be able to attract the domestic, foreign and Syrian expatriate capital needed to enhance competitiveness of Syrian goods and services sectors and to improve the prospects of long-term growth based on transfers of technology through the channels of foreign trade and FDI. Last but not least, it has been argued in Chapter 2 that no RIA, no matter what it contains or with whom it has been signed, can be a panacea. On the contrary, it needs to be part of or integrated in a comprehensive national reform programme pursuing a strategy of economic opening, liberalisation and adjustment. The 10 th FYP, which explicitly refers to the SyrianEuropean AA in addition to the GAFTA and the FTA signed with Turkey as integral parts of its strategy of gradual liberalization, includes many of the numerous measures of adjustment and macro-economic management which can't be elaborated in detail here but which are of crucial importance to making trade liberalization a success (see SPC 2006).
Conclusion
The main aim of this paper was to develop a general framework for assessment to evaluate the ability of RIAs to serve as effective mechanisms for 'commitment' and 'signalling'. Such a framework is needed, because on the one hand the effect of locking-in reform and enhancing its credibility is generally regarded as one of the most important effects of regional integration. On the other hand, however, and illustrated by the case of the Syrian-European Association Agreement, this is only true if an RIA fulfils several rather tight conditions as re-gards form, content and choice of partner. To combat problems of inconsistency and unclear motives of the government as principal causes for lack of credibility, RIAs should, among others, clearly state in its provisions the reform measures to be conducted. Moreover, to be able to contribute to changing future incentives of the anchor-seeking country's government and restricting its room of manoeuvre, RIAs should include a punishment and/or even better a detailed dispute settlement mechanism to prevent backsliding in addition to offering enhanced market access and assistance.
The case study presented in this paper was introduced by an account of Syrian reform efforts in the past highlighting their main shortcomings with special focus on the foreign trade regime and explaining the many constraints the process of economic reform is facing in Syria. To 'check' these constraints, at least to a certain degree, and to enhance credibility of reform the Syrian government could choose to sign an RIA with a strong Northern partner like the EU. The Syrian government seems to have chosen this option, albeit indirectly, when it started negotiations with the EU for the conclusion of an Association Agreement in 1998. Despite several shortcomings, this agreement should be able to deliver an appropriate mechanism for signalling and commitment and thus to improve credibility of the Syrian process of reform at home and abroad. By stipulating numerous and substantial reforms, it enables the Syrian government to send clear signals about its 'true' motives. In addition, and apart from the inclusion of the WMD clause as an essential element, the AA should provide an effective device to restrict the Syrian government's room for manoeuvre as well as to increase the 'costs of bad policy' and thus to 'tie its hands' and those of future governments.
Although being at least more 'complete' than the treaties signed with the other MPCs, the AA lacks substantial incentives for increasing the 'rewards for good policy'. For this reason the agreement's potential to lock-in reform, enhance its credibility and to encourage the Syrian government to shift its tax and political basis from declining import-substituting to growing export-oriented sectors could be improved significantly if some adjustments of the agreements' provisions were considered. Those adjustments could include, for example, a further expansion of agricultural concessions, less restrictive rules of origin and the abolition of contingent protection. Moreover, to help the Syrian administration to come to terms with the high short-term adjustment costs and to strengthen domestic administrative capacities, the EU should be prepared to provide Syria with substantially increased technical and financial assistance. Far away from initiating adjustment of the AA's provisions in favour of enhancing the 'rewards for good policy, however, it is rather doubtful at present, whether Syria and the European Union -given the current international isolation of the Syrian regime -will sign the agreement in the near or mid-term future.
In a more generalized perspective, the results of this study seem to support the view that most of the North-South RIAs concluded during the ongoing second phase of regionalism are not able to live up to the hopes assigned to them in the literature. This is particularly true for both the effect of locking-in reform and the effect of (securing and) enhancing market access which are often referred to as the most important 'non-traditional' effects of regional integration. Similar to the Syrian-European AA, agreements like NAFTA or the AAs signed between the EU and the other MPCs do not add much to improve market access conditions for the Southern partner as evidenced by a growing number of recent studies. At the same time, and as a direct result of this, they have only limited power to change future incentives of the anchor-seeking government especially since they fail to promote the necessary shift of the tax and political basis from import-substituting to export-oriented sectors. Moreover, significant other provisions which are part of the Syrian-European AA, such as the detailed dispute settlement mechanism, are mostly lacking in the other North-South RIAs. Thus, these agreements do not promise to deliver significant benefits for participating developing countries in terms of locking-in reform and enhancing its credibility.
